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ABSTRACT
The role of corporations in allocating resources has been of great importance in the
debate  about  the  manner  in  which  enterprises  should  be  governed  to  enhance
economic growth. Corporate governance features seem to be central to the dynamics
by which successful firms and economies improve their performance over time as
well as relative to each other. In this paper we try to clarify the relationship between
corporate ownership structure and output growth by using the data of La Porta et al.
(1999) on ownership structure of large- and medium-sized corporations in 27 wealthy
economies.  To  search  for  empirical  linkages,  we  use  cross-country  growth
regressions. The evidence provided in the paper suggests that an environment with a
higher  percentage  of  directly  and  indirectly  widely-held  companies  and  a  lower
degree of state than private ownership is associated with a higher growth rate of per
capita income. We also conclude that a higher degree of institutional investment does
not seem to enhance the growth performance of an economy.
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The role of corporations in allocating resources has been at the center of the
debate  about  the  manner  in  which  the  enterprises  should  be  governed  to  enhance
economic performance. The system of corporate governance determines, firstly, who
makes  investment  decisions  in  the  firm,  secondly,  what  kinds  of  investments  are
made, and thirdly, how returns from investments  are  distributed  (see  O’  Sullivan,
2000). Corporate governance features seem to be central to the dynamics by which
successful  firms  and  economies  improve  their  performance  over  time  as  well  as
relative to each other.
Recent  empirical  studies  have  examined  a  variety  of  factors  related  to
economic growth. Some of the determinants found in cross-country samples include
education (Barro, 1991), financial structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine et al.,
2000), openness of trade (Sachs and Warner, 1997) and firm size (Shaffer, 2002). In
corporate finance there exists an extensive theoretical and empirical literature that
considers  the  relationship  between  corporate  governance,  takeovers,  management
turnover,  corporate  ownership  structure  and  capital  structure  with  corporate
performance.  However,  in  most  economic  growth  analysis  it  is  assumed  that  the
nature  of  the  shareholders  and  stakeholders  of  a  country’s  firms  is  irrelevant.
Although growth theory focuses on owner-run firms, the literature on the evolution of
large  business  organizations  has  taken  a  very  different  route.  Conceptually  and
empirically, in the latter literature considerable attention has focused in recent years
on  the  impact  -  at  the  level  of  the  firm  -  of  ownership  structure  on  economic
performance.  To the best of our knowledge, the linkage between corporate ownership
structure and economic growth at the country level is a neglected area.
The standard definition of corporate governance among economists and
legal scholars refers to problems arising from the separation of ownership and
control,  namely,  the  agency  relationship  between  a  principal  (investors  in
publicly-traded firms, voters for utilities) and an agent (managers for corporations,
politicians for state-controlled firms). A divergence of interest between managers
and  shareholders  (or  between  politicians  and  voters)  may  cause  managers
(politicians) to take actions that are costly to shareholders (voters).6
One  of  the  most  striking  differences  between  countries’  corporate
governance  systems  relates  to  the  cross-country  difference  between  firm
ownership and control. This difference is not simply an accident of history, but the
result  of  major  differences  among  the  legal  and  regulatory  environments  of
countries. Systems of corporate governance can be distinguished according to the
degree of ownership and control as well as the identity of controlling shareholders.
According to OECD terminology, in ‘outsider’ systems of corporate governance
(i.e. the Anglo-Saxon countries) the conflict of interest tends to be between strong
managers and widely-dispersed shareholders. In contrast, in ‘insider’ systems (for
example, Continental Europe and Japan), the core conflict tends to be between
controlling shareholders (and sometimes between strong stakeholders) and weak
minority shareholders.
A  main  benefit  of  concentrated  ownership  is  that  it  permits  a  more
effective monitoring of management. But the costs associated with concentrated
ownership  involve  low  liquidity  and  reduced  risk  diversification,  whereas
dispersed  ownership  is  associated  with  higher  liquidity  and  more  efficient
resource  allocation.  A  liquid  market  for  equity  allows  the  link  between  the
preferences of successful capitalists for consumption and saving to be separated
from the productive process. However, in the context of a liquid stock market,
dispersed ownership may not encourage the long-term relationships required for
long-term  business  investments  that  increase  the  productive  capacity  of  the
economy.
In  this  paper  we  try  to  clarify  the  relationship  between  corporate
governance and economic growth by using the data of La Porta et al. (1999) on
ownership  structures  of  large-  and  medium-sized  corporations  in  27  advanced
economies for the period 1990-2002 in order to identify the ultimate controlling
shareholders  of  these  firms.  To  determine  empirical  linkages,  we  use  cross-
country growth regressions. The results suggest that an environment with a higher
percentage of directly and indirectly widely-held companies and a lower degree of
state than private ownership is associated with a higher growth rate of per capita
income. We also find that a higher degree of institutional investment does not
seem to enhance the growth performance of an economy.7
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  explains  why
corporate governance is important for economic prosperity. Section 3 presents the
model  specification  and  describes  the  data  and  variables  used  in  our  empirical
analysis. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2.  Why  Corporate  Governance  is  Important  for  Economic
Prosperity?
2.1 Identity of Owners and Agency Costs
A broad definition of corporate governance refers to the exercise of power
over corporate entities. However, the existence of a corporate enterprise itself does
not  give  rise  to  governance  issues;  such  issues  arise  when  ownership  of  the
enterprise is separated from its management. Principal agent theory suggests that
good corporate governance needs to address ‘both an adverse selection and a moral
hazard problem’ (see Tirole, 2001). This definition leads to the view that a good
structure  of  corporate  governance  is  one  that  leads  to  the  selection  of  the  most
efficient  managers,  and  simultaneously,  makes  them  fully  accountable  to  the
suppliers of finance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In  their  classic  study,  Berle  and  Means  (1932)  warned  that  the  growing
dispersion  of  ownership  of  US  stocks  gave  rise  to  a  potentially  value-reducing
separation  of  ownership  and  control.  When  capital  is  dispersed  among  small
shareholders,  control  is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  managers.  Moral-hazard
considerations  suggest  that  a  divergence  in  interests  between  managers  and
shareholders can cause managers to take actions that are costly to shareholders
1.
Contracts between the two groups cannot preclude this activity if shareholders are
unable  to  observe  managerial  behaviour  directly.  Adverse  selection  arises  from
differences in managerial ability that cannot be observed by shareholders. In moral-
hazard considerations the power of ownership could be used to induce managers to
act  in  a  manner  that  is  consistent  with  the  interests  of  shareholders.  In  adverse
selection ownership may be used to induce managers to reveal private information
about their ability to generate cash flow.
                                           
1For the original formulation of the agency theory, see Jensen and Meckling (1976).8
The share of the firm’s stock, owned by its manager, is at the core of the
agency problem. If this share, say  , equals unity, the firm is privately-held and
managers  pay  the  cost  in  terms  of  a  lower  value  of  the  firm  of  any  perks  and
corporate  resources  they  consume  (for  example,  a  corrupt  hiring  policy,  an
unprofitable but prestigious expansion of the firm, or a merger/acquisition aimed at
empire building). If   ³ [0,1], the enterprise has more than one shareholder who
subsidizes any perks. If the perks correspond to one per cent of the firm’s total
assets,  the  agency  cost  for  public  shareholders  is  (1- )  because  of  lower  equity
value. If the firm goes public (  typically declines), the manager can raise his or her
consumption of perks. However, rational shareholders would behave in such a way
so  as  to  depress  the  firm’s  market  value.  The  problem  has  the  appearance  of  a
prisoner’s dilemma situation; the costs to any small shareholder of monitoring the
manager exceed the benefits of monitoring, even though shareholders in  general
would gain.
2.2 Shareholder versus Stakeholder Models of Governance
Before investigating the relationship between corporate ownership structure
and  economic  growth,  it  is  necessary  to  briefly  review  the  leading  theories  of
corporate governance, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models. According
to the shareholder model, the objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder value
through allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Managers have an implicit
obligation to ensure that firms are run in the interests of shareholders. The origin of
this model is the implicit assumption that employees, suppliers, creditors, customers
and other natural stakeholders are well protected by effective contracts or laws that
force controlling investors to perfectly internalize their welfare. The stakeholders
have  contractual  claims  for  fixed  pre-arranged  amounts  (i.e.  wages,  interest
payments or other invoice amounts) against the firm’s assets.  Consequently, the
shareholders  are  entitled  to  the  residual  value  left  over  once  all  the  contractual
claims are settled
2. They are the residual claimants, who seek to maximize the value
                                           
2Contractual claimants’ strategy may typically involve two stages. In the first stage, they aim at the
maximization of the values of their claims, determined by demand and supply conditions in labour
markets  (employees  and  managers),  in  money  markets  (creditors)  and  in  capital  or  final  goods
markets (suppliers and customers). In a second stage, they attempt to minimize the probability that
the firm will default before contractual claims are paid.9
of their residual claims, which is equivalent to maximizing the value of the firm’s
assets. In this theoretical framework
3, control rights should be assigned to residual
claimants.  By  maximizing  the  value  of  their  own  claims,  they  ensure  that  the
contractual claimants are paid. One of the shortcomings of the shareholder model
arises if the firm is in, or near, bankruptcy; in such circumstances, the creditors
usually become residual claimants.
The debate among the economists and legal scholars mainly concerns the
practical implementation of shareholder value principle as well as its legitimacy.
Attention is paid to what constitutes an efficient monitoring structure. Owners hire
managers  to  run  the  firm  so  as  to  generate  returns  on  their  investment.  An
asymmetric  information  problem  can  arise,  however,  since  managers  tend  to  be
better informed about the best alternative uses for the shareholders’ funds. Tirole
(2001) specifies three mechanisms toward a partial alignment of the firm’s decision-
making with the interests of its shareholders or generally investors. Two of these
relate to managerial incentives. First, monetary compensation (bonuses and stock
options) may encourage managers to behave in the owners’ interest; and, second,
managers’ career concerns may stimulate them to please their shareholders. The
third  mechanism  relates  to  the  control  structure.  Investors  may  engage  in
‘monitoring  and  exercise  voice’  aiming  at  making  the  firm  more  efficient  and
raising the firm’s net present value.
Turning  to  the  stakeholder  model,  the  basic  arguments  in  favour  of  this
model  are  associated  with  the  weaknesses  of  the  shareholder  value  model.  The
shareholder model is based on weak assumptions in that it specifies relations only
between shareholders and owners. Specifically, shareholders are not the only ones
who invest in the corporation. The competitiveness and the ultimate success of an
enterprise is the consequence of group-work, which includes the attempts of a wide
variety of resource providers, including portfolio investors, employees, creditors,
suppliers, customers etc. The performance of the enterprise will be influenced by the
industrial relations among several stakeholders (see Kester, 1992). This model takes
a  broader  view  of  the  enterprise
4.  For  example,  Blair  (1995)  argued  that  while
                                           
3The  incomplete  contracts’  view  of  the  firm  has  been  developed  by  Coase  (1937),  Jensen  and
Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Williamson (1985).
4In  its  traditional  version,  the  stakeholder  model  includes  some  other  social  partners,  such  as
members of the community in which the enterprise is located, environmental institutions or national10
shareholders have a residual claimant status, the physical capital assets in which
they invest are not the only assets that create value in the firm. Employees also
invest in their own human capital and to some extent their skills are specific to the
enterprise for which they work (see also Becker, 1975). As a consequence, they bear
some of the risk related to the company’s activities.
2.3 The Relationship between Ownership and Performance at Firm Level
Agency  costs  in  public  corporations  will  determine  the  way  in  which
ownership structure may influence the dynamic efficiency of the business sector.
This  occurs  because  agency  costs  represent  reductions  in  value  because  of  the
separation of ownership from control. Jensen (1986, 1989) argues that dispersed
ownership is leading to major inefficiencies in US companies. In his view, the rise
of hostile takeovers and LBOs in the 1980s is a value-increasing response by capital
markets  through  the  removal  of  inefficient  managers  and  concentrations  of
corporate  ownership,  respectively.  However,  Demsetz  (1983)  and  Demsetz  and
Lehn  (1985)  argue  that  concentrated  ownership  also  entails  significant  costs.
Specifically,  concentrated  ownership  not  only  provides  stronger  incentives  to
maximize value, but also incurs serious costs that arise from excessive concentration
of risk and the potential for expropriating minority holders. Thus, at low levels of
ownership  concentration,  the  incentive  effect  would  lead  to  a  positive  relation
between ownership concentration and performance. At higher levels of ownership
concentration, it has been argued (see Morck et al., 1989) that control mechanisms,
such as the market for takeovers, LBOs and boards of directors, may be ineffective
as ownership becomes more concentrated. In such a case (high values of  ), the
CEO effectively has uncontestable control over his or her enterprise. He or she is
not vulnerable to hostile takeovers, significant board challenges or attacks by large
investors. Minority shareholders can rarely affect corporate policy, and ultimately,
                                                                                                                            
governments,  together  with  the  contractual  and  residual  claimants.  In  addition,  the  traditional
perspective is often exposited in terms of a political position rather than as an economic theory of
governance. For example, Kelly et al. (1997) take as given that the enterprises that rely  on  the
experience of their stakeholders will be more efficient, whereas the solidarity between social classes
of a country is a requirement for international competitiveness. It has been argued (see Maher and
Anderson, 1999 and OECD, 1999) that, from this perspective, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
make sure that firms fulfil these wider objectives.11
the manager is ‘entrenched’, so as to maximize his or her own utility
5. This means
that a negative correlation between ownership concentration and performance will
emerge.  For  even  greater  levels  of  ownership,  the  incentive  effect  would  again
dominate leading to a positive relation.
6  Apparently, the relationship is non-linear.
Another dispute about the ability of widely held ownership (small values of
) to generate efficiency and growth deals with the short-sightedness of the stock
market (see O’ Sullivan, 2000). Financial historians support (see Lazonick and O’
Sullivan, 1997a, 1997b, 2000) that the notion of public shareholders investing in
productive  assets  has  little  basis  in  the  history  of  the  successful  industrial
development of the US or any other industrial economy.  They find that the stock
market  does  not  serve  as  the  main  source  of  funds  for  long-term  business
investment. They also find that, although portfolio investors play a crucial role in
the development of the corporate economy, these investors do not play a significant
financing role. In other words, investors do not wait until the planned investments
‘bear fruit’. Moreover, this kind of historical analysis incriminates the rise of the
shareholder  value  principle  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries  in  the  shift  of  corporate
strategy from a retention of earnings and reinvestment, towards a downsizing of
labour  costs  (in  an  attempt  to  raise  the  return  on  equity)  and  a  distribution  of
earnings to shareholders.
                                           
5 It has been argued that entrenchment may be possible at values of   below 0.5 if, for example,
managers direct activities to areas where they have unique expertise (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).
6 Stulz (1988) models the trade-off between low and high levels of  . The empirical literature has
used  accounting-based  performance  measures,  such  as  the  return  on  capital,  or  market-based
measures, such as Tobin’s q, to  investigate  the  matter.  For  a  detailed  presentation  of  the  micro
econometrics  of  corporate  governance  studies,  see  Baghat  and  Jefferis  (2002).  Gugler  (2001)
provides a detailed survey of empirical studies on the relationship between ownership concentration
and firm performance. The studies about the relation between both variables seem to have yielded
conflicting  results.  Some  papers  find  that  the  owner-controlled  firms  significantly  outperform
manager-controlled ones (see Morck et al., 1988; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Agrawal and Knoeber,
1996; Cho, 1998). Other papers find no evidence of a relation between ownership concentration and
firm performance (see, for example, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and some others treat ownership
structure  as  an  endogenous  variable    (Himmelberg  et  al.,  1999;  Demsetz  and  Villalonga,  2001;
Gugler and Weigand, 2003). The ownership structure of the firm may be endogenously determined
by the firms’ contracting environment. For example, superior firm performance could lead to an
increase in the value of stock options owned by the management. All empirical studies rely chiefly12
2.4 The Relationship between Ownership and Performance at Country Level
International corporate structures are not homogenous and this circumstance has
a direct impact on incentives in any economy and an indirect impact on business
culture. A simple structural difference is the often-cited split between the Anglo-
American model, the German model and the Japanese model (sometimes called the
keiretsu). A complete discussion of these models is beyond the scope of the paper.
We only describe an ideal model in each area that abstracts from the actual diversity
and complexity in real situations.
7
 For  the  United  States,  the  ideal  type  of  corporation  is  that  with  equity
ownership  diffused  between  a  multitude  of  small  stockholders  and  a  self-
perpetuating management firmly in control under most circumstances. However, the
separation of ownership from control results in so-called agency costs. The degree
of  discipline  over  management  is  provided  by  the  threat,  and  occasionally  the
reality, of proxy contests, hostile takeovers and leveraged buy-outs. US managerial
concern  with  shareholder  value  is  merely  a  specific  application  of  the  cultural
attitude of American society where the ‘individual is the king’. As Miller (2003,
p.519)  put  it  ‘not  the  nation,  not  the  government,  not  the  producers,  not  the
merchants,  but  the  individual  –  and  especially  the  individual  consumer  –  is
sovereign’ .
By contrast, the ideal type of corporation in the Japanese tradition is the
keiretsu, thought of as a group of companies linked by stable cross-shareholdings
and seller-buyer relationships. A parent company, or more often a main bank, is
supposed  to  act  as  the  administrator  for  the  group  by  monitoring  management
performance  (see Nakamura, 2002; Aoki et al., 1994; Morck and Nakamura, 1999).
However, important changes in the operating environment of Japanese banks – such
as deregulation, increasing exposure to globalisation, the collapse of asset prices in
the 1990s and the banking crisis that followed – may be leading to a decline of the
keiretsu system (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; Anderson and Campbell, 2004).
                                                                                                                            
on Tobin’s q as a measure of firm performance, although a few examine accounting profit rate as an
alternative measure of firm performance.
7 For a description of the evolution of corporate governance in Japan and the euro area, see Yafeh
(2000) and Hartmann,  Maddaloni  and  Manganelli  (2003),  respectively.  For  a  comparison  of  the
British and American corporate governance structures with those of Germany and Japan, see Dove,
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1999) and Gugler, Mueller and Yortoglou (2004), respectively.13
In Germany, the standard account for the business sector looks at only a few
hundred  large  firms,  listed  on  the  stock  exchange  and  operating  under  the
supervisory board system required for companies with more than 2,000 employees
who elect half the supervisory board. German banks, as universal banks, can own
corporate stock, unlike US banks (Franks and Mayer, 2003). Only three cases of
hostile takeovers have taken place in Germany during the post-WWII period, and in
all cases the banks’ influence has derived from the chairmanship of supervisory
boards and the proxy votes which they cast on behalf of individual shareholders (see
Franks  and  Mayer,  1998).  Banks  may  influence  corporate  governance  via  their
control of proxy votes, their position on supervisory boards and their provision of
loan finance
8. In addition to the usual emphasis placed on the role of the German
banks,  it  is  increasingly  recognised  that  in  large  firms  ownership  is  highly
concentrated.  As  Edwards  and  Nibler  (2000)  have  shown,  any  case  of  German
corporate governance superiority should be based on high ownership concentration
rather than on the special role of the banks.
Following the Asian financial crisis of 1992-98, there has been renewed interest
in Japan as well as in Europe, in identifying the aspects of the Anglo-American
corporate governance system that might be implementable elsewhere (see OECD,
1999).  Indeed,  some  writers  have  expressed  the  view  that  Japan’s  prolonged
economic slump may, in part, reflect  deeper  maladies  in  the  Japanese  corporate
governance  (Morck and Nakamura, 1999).
The  specific  institutional  characteristics  of  each  country’s  average  corporate
structure  will  mark  the  emergence  of  a  shareholder  or  a  stakeholder  society.
Effectively, these can be viewed as two extreme cases of the spectrum. A mixed
type of corporate culture may be closer to one or the other extreme case. The main
potential problem with countries close to the stakeholder society model is that the
interests  of  equity  investors  may  be  insufficiently  represented  in  corporate
governance. In other words, it can be argued that Germany’s main banking system
and  the  Japanese  financial  keiretsu  system,  which  leave  corporate  governance
largely  in  the  hands  of  creditors  rather  than  shareholders,  could  lead  to  a
misallocation of capital. It can also be argued that, when corporations are run to
                                           
8  For  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  significance  of  ownership  structure  of  German  firms  on  bank
corporate control, see Edwards and Fischer (1994).14
maximize the shareholder value, the performance of the economy as a whole, and
not only the interests of the shareholders, are enhanced.
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Additionally, investments in stakeholder relationships might reduce short-term
external flexibility, which may lower the value of the company in case of external
shocks. Also, if strong fixed claimants transfer wealth to themselves from equity
claimants by using their influence and control to reduce the riskiness of firms, they
may  provoke  contractionary  effects  in  a  nation’s  economy.
10  In  countries  with
concentrated corporate ownership, like Japan and Germany, there are large blocks
of  shareholders  that  take  an  active  role  in  management  to  reduce  managerial
shirking and misconduct. The takeover market in these countries is too restricted
and fixed claimants are completely unable to protect themselves contractually from
the  moral  hazard,  which  influences  the  behaviour  of  those  who  have  borrowed.
Besides,  allocative  efficiency  may  be  reduced  by  raising  the  cost  of  capital.
Managers in such an environment remain oriented towards a strategy that stresses
retention and reinvestment rather than simply using corporate revenues to increase
dividends or to repurchase shares in order to boost stock prices. The pursuit of such
strategies may permit a lot of different stakeholders to gain (workers, suppliers and
consumers). Finally, Morck et al. (2004) argue that pyramidal control structures,
cross shareholding and super voting rights are common outside the Anglo-Saxon
world. Using these devices, a family can control  corporations without making a
commensurate  capital  investment.  These  ownership  structures  create  agency  and
entrenchment  problems  simultaneously.  In  other  words,  the  extensive  control  of
corporate assets by a few families may reduce the rate of innovation and lead to an
economy-wide misallocation of resources and, thus,  a slower  growth rate of the
economy.
3. The Model and the Variables
Following  the  empirical  growth  literature  (see,  for  example,  Levine  and
Renelt,  1991,  1992),  we  use  cross-country  regressions  to  examine  the  empirical
                                           
9  Shareholders’  returns  are  regarded  as  incentives  for  waiting,  risk  bearing  and  monitoring  of
managers.15
linkage  between  long-run  growth  rates  and  corporate  governance.  In  previous
studies, cross-country regressions have been widely used to investigate whether a
statistically  significant  relationship  exists  between  growth  and  a  wide  variety  of
macroeconomic, political and institutional indicators. In what follows, we extend
the literature by examining whether corporate ownership is significantly correlated
with  long-run  per  capita  growth  rates.  We  also  provide  the  correlation  between
output growth and the particular variable of interest. Such a correlation would imply
that the partial correlation between per capita growth rates and corporate ownership
remains statistically significant with the sign predicted by theory even when the
vector of the exogenous control variables in the growth regression changes.
The basic empirical growth equation estimated is:
Yj=  i Ij +  m Mj +  z Zj + uj (1)
where a subscript j indicates that the variable refers to the jth country. We assume,
as  in  most  cross-country  growth  regressions,  that  the  explanatory  variables  are
entered linearly (see Kormendi and Meguire, 1985). To examine the robustness of
the  main  results,  we  estimate  several  versions  of  equation  (1)  for  27  developed
economies.
11 Y is the average annual percentage change of real GDP per capita
from 1990 to 2002. I is a set of explanatory variables always included in the cross-
country growth regressions. The particular variables used correspond to those found
in previous empirical studies as well as in theoretical  considerations (see Barro,
1991).
M is the variable of interest, which is a measure of corporate ownership
structure.  We  are  interested  in  whether  firms  in  each  country  have  substantial
owners.  Our  purpose  is  not  to  measure  ownership  structure  but  to  use  several
definitions of the ‘average’ or the ‘usual’ owner. In particular, we use the ownership
definitions  of  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999),  who  do  not  try  to  measure  ownership
                                                                                                                            
10  Perhaps,  the  most  expansionary  impact  on  growth  might  come  from  a  corporate  culture  that
reaches  the  appropriate  bargaining  equilibrium  between  the  risk  taking  proclivities  of  the
shareholders and the risk avoidance proclivities of the other stakeholders.16
concentration, because a theoretically appropriate measure would require a model of
the interactions between large shareholders, which does not exist. Rather, they try to
define owners. The idea that motivates their definitions of ownership is to know
whether corporations have shareholders with a substantial proportion of the voting
rights,  either  directly  or  through  a  chain  of  holdings.  For  this  purpose,  their
definitions rely on voting rights rather than cash flow rights.
Using  the  data  of  La  Porta  et  al.,  we  can  assign  firms  to  one  of  two
categories – widely-held (either directly or indirectly) and narrowly-held (that is,
with a limited number of owners).
12 Firms are assigned on the basis of either a 10
per  cent  threshold  or  a  20  per  cent  threshold.  Thus,  using  the  10  (20)  per  cent
threshold, a firm is categorized as narrowly-held if 10 (20) per cent or more of the
voting rights associated with shares in that firm are held by one shareholder. In this
way, firms defined as narrowly-owned under the 20 per cent threshold are a subset
of those defined as narrowly-owned under the 10 per cent threshold. Firms can be
categorized as narrowly-held even if control by a shareholder is indirect. Thus a
shareholder may have indirect control over firm A if it directly  controls firm B
which  directly  controls  firm  A  or  if  it  directly  controls  firm  C  which  directly
controls firm B which, in turn, directly controls 10 (20) per cent or more of the
voting rights in firm A (La Porta et al., 1999, pp.476-77).
La Porta et al. use two samples of corporations for each country. The first
sample contains the 20 largest firms in each country according to their stock market
capitalization at end-1995 (we  call this the large-sized  corporation  sample).  The
second consists of the smallest 10 firms with a stock market capitalization of at least
$500 million at end-1995 (the medium-sized corporation sample).
Our variable of interest, CO, which is calculated at the country level, is the
number  of  widely-held  corporations  (including  the  number  of  corporations
controlled by another widely-held corporation or financial institution) divided by the
number  of  narrowly-held  corporations.  Four  variations  on  this  variable  are  used
depending on the sample of corporations and the threshold used. Thus:
                                                                                                                            
11 The economies in our sample are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, the UK, the US, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.17
(i)  COL10  uses  the  large-sized  corporation  sample  with  the  10  per  cent
threshold;
(ii)  COL20  uses  the  large-sized  corporation  sample  with  the  20  per  cent
threshold;
(iii) COM10 uses the medium-sized corporation sample with the 10 per cent
threshold;
(iv) COM20 uses the medium-sized corporation sample with the 20 per cent
threshold.
We  also  consider  two  other  alternative  measures  of  corporate  ownership
structure.  In  particular,  a  widely-accepted  strand  of  the  empirical  literature
documents the view that private enterprises are generally more efficient than state
enterprises.
13 This argument is associated with the increasing interest world-wide
during the last two decades in the privatisation process. The main reasons for the
superior  efficiency  of  private  ownership  are  (Phelps  1993):  stronger
entrepreneurship;  lower  pressure  from  special  interest  groups  and  lobbying
activities; a longer time horizon of managers than politicians, and a larger penalty
for failing to maximize profits. More recently, a cross-country study (La Porta et al.,
2000)  finds  that  government  ownership  of  banks  is  associated  with  lower
subsequent growth of per capita income, an underdeveloped financial system and a
poor protection of property rights. In line with our model specification, we use the
ratio of the number of state-controlled corporations to the rest of corporations as a
proxy for state ownership for the sample of large- and medium-sized firms using 10
and 20 per cent threshold (namely, COLS10 COLS20, COMS10, COMS20). This
measure is used to capture the effect of state ownership on per capita output growth.
The second measure is used to estimate the effect of institutional ownership
on output growth. Institutional investors, because of their greater bargaining power
                                                                                                                            
12 The database of La Porta et al. (1999) allows for five types: family-owned/individual-owned firms;
state-owned  firms;  widely-held  financial  institutions;  widely-held  corporations,  and  finally,
miscellaneous (e.g. a cooperative, a voting trust or a group with no single controlling investor).18
over  the  firm  relative  to  individuals,  are  well  placed  to  minimize  the  corporate
governance  problems  arising  from  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control.
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However,  institutional  shareholders  typically  do  not  adopt  a  monitoring  role,
preferring to sell their holdings in problematic corporations rather than intervening
in  their  management.  Three  factors  are  said  to  contribute  to  this  situation  (see
Keasey  and  Wright,  1997).  First,  if  institutional  shareholders  intervene  publicly,
they may draw attention to the difficulties facing the corporation. Such a move may
cause the share price to fall, reducing the value of their investment. Second, getting
involved in the management may give them access to inside information precluding
them from trading their shares. Finally, effective monitoring is costly in terms of
time and money for investors who hold such diversified portfolios.
To estimate the effects of institutional ownership we introduce as a proxy the
ratio  of  the  number  of  widely-held  corporations  controlled  by  a  widely-held
financial institution as a proportion of all remaining corporations. Again, we use all
the criteria of La Porta et al. (1999). Thus, we take both the sample of large- and
medium-sized firms and use both the 10 and 20 per cent thresholds (i.e. COLF10,
COLF20, COMF10, COMF20).
Z is the conditioning information set. This is a vector of exogenous control
variables used as indicators of macroeconomic and political stability. They are taken
from a pool of variables contained in past empirical studies on economic growth.
Finally, u is a serially uncorrelated, but possibly heteroskedastic, random error term.
The  I-variables  consist  of  a  constant;  investment  as  a  share  of  GDP
(representing the accumulated level of physical capital); the logarithm of the initial
level of real GDP per capita, as of the beginning of the sample period (1991) (it is
intended  to  capture  the  convergence  effect  noted  by  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin,
1992)
15;  the  average  annual  rate  of  population  growth;  and  the  share  of  public
                                                                                                                            
13  For  a  detailed  review  of  these  empirical  studies,  see  World  Bank  (1995).  For  a  theoretical
modelling of the relationship between state ownership and economic growth, see Gylfason et al.
(2001).
14 Davis (2002) provides a literature survey on micro evidence. Even though the outcome is mixed,
he on balance suggests a positive effect of institutional corporate governance on equity returns.
15 The coefficient on the initial level of real GDP per capita is often used to test the convergence
hypothesis: a poor country, ceteris paribus, tends to grow faster than a rich country and hence the per
capita income level of the former will catch up with the latter. Specifically, countries with low level
of real GDP per capita at the beginning of the period will experience higher rates of output growth
throughout the period through the transfer of technology and knowledge from the leaders.19
expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP as an index of education (a proxy
for the accumulated level of human capital).
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The  Z-variables  consist  of  the  average  rate  of  government  consumption
expenditures  to  GDP  (a  fiscal  policy  indicator);  the  ratio  of  exports  to  GDP
(openness of trade); the average inflation rate or the standard deviation of inflation
(a monetary policy indicator). The conditioning information set is built up stepwise,
starting with a simple vector of explanatory variables (I-variables) and then adding
other variables (Z-variables) (see also Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001).
Table  1  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  the  I-,  M-  and  Z-variables.  It
reports the mean values, standard deviations, maxima and minima of the variables in
our sample as well as skewness and kurtosis. Figure 1 maps real GDP per capita
growth rates (Yj) and corporate ownership structure (COM10j).
4. Empirical Results
Table 2 reports estimates from the ‘basic’  regression containing only the
usual variables found in the literature (the I-variables) and the particular variable of
interest, whereas Tables 3-6 report estimates for a variety of the control variables
(Z-variables),  so  as  to  examine  the  robustness  of  the  main  results.  Empirical
findings from the basic regression indicate a positive and statistically significant
effect  of  education  on  growth.  The  investment  coefficient  is  also  positive  and
significant.  Population  growth,  even  though  it  has  the  sign  predicted  by  theory
(negative), is not significant in the majority of the regressions, while the correlation
between growth and initial income is negative as expected and significant.
In the regressions reported in Table 2, we examine whether the control of
large  publicly-traded  firms  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  determination  of  the
growth rate of real GDP per capita. We find that corporate ownership structure has a
strong statistically significant positive impact on growth performance, when the 10
per cent criterion for control is employed. However, when we employ the 20 per
cent criterion, the regression coefficient is negative but does not differ statistically
significantly from zero.
                                           
16 The initial secondary-school enrolment rate is also a proxy for education (Barro, 1991). However,
missing values for some countries make the problem of small sample size very important.20
By looking for shareholders who control more than 10 per cent of the votes,
we adopt a more rigorous definition of a widely-held company. The 10 per cent
criterion for control may have two advantages in the attempt to clarify the direction
of the relationship between corporate structure and economic growth. Firstly, the
cutoff of 10 per cent provides a significant threshold of votes by including the most
active owners. Secondly, most countries mandate disclosure of 10  per  cent,  and
usually even lower, ownership stakes. As La Porta et al. (1999) note, their standard
procedures of data collection do not work for several countries because disclosure is
so limited. For example, the data for Greece and Mexico have been collected from
the 20 largest corporations for which they could find ownership data, whereas for
Israel and Korea they used  Internet sources and information for the  year 1984
17
respectively.
Consistent with the findings of the impact of COL10, we conclude that a
‘widely-held’  corporate  structure  facilitates  economic  growth  when  we  use  the
COM10 and COM20 versions of our variable of interest. In all the estimates, the
regression coefficients have a positive sign and are statistically different from zero
(see  Tables  5  and  6).  The  effect  of  the  ownership  structure  of  medium-sized
publicly-traded firms on economic growth is not only statistically significant, but
also more economically important than the ownership structure of large publicly-
traded firms. We can use the estimate of the regression coefficient in Table 2 to
infer how much higher the growth rate of a country would be if a re-structuring of
the country’s corporate ownership were to take place.
The  estimated  coefficient  of  COL10  is  0.0004  while  the  coefficient  of
COM10 is 0.021. We can set the two variables of interest at their overall means. In
this case, the regression coefficient estimates predict an increase of 0.063% in the
average annual growth rate after a doubling of COL10 (1.568) and an increase of
0.63% after an equivalent increase in COM10 (0.302). The larger impact of the
variable COM10 in comparison with the other specifications could be interpreted as
an indication that the control of medium-sized publicly-traded firms is the most
representative  definition  of  ownership  structure  for  a  country.  This  definition  is
based on a sample of firms with stock capitalisation of at least $500million and not
only on the largest ones.
                                           
17 It was the last available date with reliable data.21
The importance of the effect of corporate ownership structure on economic
growth can also be demonstrated by a comparison of two countries in the sample
with completely different ownership structure, for example Argentina and the USA.
Argentina is a country with a relatively low percentage of widely-held companies,
whereas  the  US  is  a  country  with  a  relatively  high  percentage  of  widely-held
companies. The regression coefficient estimate predicts that if Argentina had the
same ownership structure as the US, the average annual growth rate of per capita
income would increase, ceteris paribus, by 2.1 percentage points (i.e. the coefficient
of COM10 in the ‘basic’ regression times the value that COM10 takes for the US).
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The degree of state control - measured by the ratio of state controlled firms
to the rest of the corporations in  each  country  -  has  a  negative  and  statistically
significant effect on per capita income growth (see Table 7).  This result provides
support  for  the  view  that  a  divergent  interest  between  politicians  as  agents  and
voters as principles may lead to incompetence and corruption. This explanation is
consistent with considerable evidence documenting the inefficiency of government
enterprises, the political motives behind public provision of services and the benefits
of privatisation (see Megginson et al., 1994; Barberis et al., 1996; Lopez de Silanes
et al., 1997;  Frydman et al.,1999).
Again, comparing two countries in the sample with a different degree of
state control, for example, Austria and the US, we can detect how important the
effect  of  corporate  control  on  economic  growth  is.  Austria  is  a  country  with  a
relatively high percentage of state-controlled firms, whereas the US is a country
with a relatively low degree of state control. The regression coefficient estimate
predicts  that  if  Austria  had  the  same  degree  of  state  ownership  as  the  US,  the
average annual growth rate of per capita income would improve, ceteris paribus, by
0.5 percentage points (i.e. the coefficient of COMS10 in the ‘basic’ regression times
the value that COMS10 takes for the US).
As far as the institutional ownership variable is concerned, the regression
coefficients are not significantly different from zero, as the results reported in Table
                                           
18 As Figure 1 suggests, Ireland may play a substantial role in the empirical results, especially in the
light of the relatively low t-ratios on the variables of interest. One might suspect that the results are
being driven by the observation at the top right hand corner. Thus,  we  re-estimate  equation  (1)
excluding Ireland from the sample. We note that the empirical results, in general, do not change22
8 reveal. However, it is very difficult to conclude whether this factor is irrelevant to
output growth, or simply the result of two opposing effects related to institutional
investing.  The  first  one  concerns  the  greater  bargaining  power  of  institutional
investors  over  the  enterprises  relative  to  individual  investors.  Consequently,  the
problem arising from the separation of ownership and control is minimized and the
asset allocation becomes more efficient. The second one refers to the disincentives –
mentioned above – for institutional investors to undertake an active monitoring rule.
Finally, the relationship between ownership structure and economic growth
seems to be robust to changes in model specification. In particular, adding the Z-
variables  stepwise,  the  empirical  findings  do  not  change  considerably.
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Furthermore, Ramsey’s Reset stability test fails to indicate specification error in all
cross-country regressions. The estimated coefficients of all measures of corporate
ownership structure do not change sign or level of significance compared with the
results in the ‘basic regression’. The fiscal policy indicator has a positive and robust
effect on growth, whereas inflation and its standard deviation are negatively related
to growth. Openness also enters positively and significantly in the growth equation.
However, this link between exports and growth is only found when investment is
dropped from the set of I-variables.
5. Conclusions
Countries differ in many ways, including in terms of corporate ownership
structures. In this paper we have investigated a rather neglected aspect of cross-
section economic growth modelling, that of the structure of corporate ownership.
Empirical findings suggest that an environment with a higher percentage of directly
and  indirectly  widely-held  companies  and  a  lower  degree  of  state  ownership  is
associated with a higher growth rate of per capita income. We also conclude that a
higher  degree  of  institutional  investing  does  not  seem  to  enhance  the  growth
performance  of  an  economy.  These  findings  might  be  very  informative  on  the
benefits received from the disciplinary effect of a well-developed and more liquid
stock market, as well as from privatisations.
                                                                                                                            
substantially, even though in some regressions the t-ratios become a little lower. Overall, the sign and
the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the variables of interest remain unaffected.
19 The tables reporting the empirical results are available upon request.23
Three  caveats,  however,  are  in  order.  First,  the  simple  reasoning  that  if
Argentina had the same corporate structure as the US, she might have had a higher
growth rate overlooks the fact that a change in corporate ownership structure will
change the entrepreneurial culture, the level of financial development as well as
many  other  structural  determinants  of  economic  growth.  This  suggests  that  our
calculations  of  the  effect  of  corporate  ownership  change  on  economic  growth  –
which is based upon a single equation model – underestimate the actual influence of
such structural change.  Moreover, corporate ownership structure can be treated as
an endogenous variable. Ownership structure is as likely to affect economic growth
as  economic  growth  is  likely  to  affect  corporate  ownership  structures.  This
endogeneity should be taken into account when seeking to ascertain the relation
between  economic  growth  and  ownership.  For  example,  Doidge  et  al.  (2004)
present a model which shows that the incentives to adopt better ownership structures
at firm level increase with a country’s financial and economic development. Second,
country coverage is limited due to data availability. Third, the empirical analysis
compares only a very short time period, 1990-2002. This is because country indices
of corporate governance do not exist for a longer time period. The choice of the
sample period might test the reliability of the empirical results. For example, Japan
clearly grew much faster than the US during the 20
th century and has grown more
slowly  in  the  last  decade  of  the  century.  So,  it  might  be  perfectly  sensible  to
conclude that different corporate structures contribute to different growth rates at
different  stages  of  an  economy’s  development.  No  particular  way  of  structuring
corporate finances is better than any other in all circumstances; different systems
have different strengths and weaknesses.
Suggestions for future research would include the construction of a larger
database  involving  more  refined  country  indices  of  corporate  governance.  This
should  take  into  account  the  role  of  the  structure  of  the  board  of  directors,  the
importance of takeovers and managerial compensation and other incentives.24
Data Appendix: Definitions and Sources
  Real  GDP  per  capita  is  the  average  growth  rate  of  real  GDP  per  capita,  in
percent, 1990-2002. Source: IFS, IMF (Yearbook).
  The data for corporate ownership structure are from La Porta et al. (1999).
  Education  is  public  expenditures  on  education  as  percent  to  GDP  as  of
1999/2000. Source: Unesco, Institute of Statistics.
  Population  is  the  average  growth  rate  of  population,  in  percent,  1990-2002.
Source: IFS, IMF (Yearbook).
  Initial real per capita GDP is the level of real GDP per capita as of 1991 in US
dollars. Source: IFS, IMF (Yearbook).
  Investment  is  the  average  share  of  gross  fixed  capital  formation  in  GDP,  in
percent, 1990-2002. Source: IFS, IMF (Yearbook).
  Government consumption is the ratio of government consumption spending to
GDP, in percent, 1990-2002. Source: IFS, IMF (Yearbook).
  Openness is the ratio of total exports of goods and services to GDP, in percent,
1990-2002. Source: IFS, IMF (Yearbook).
  Inflation is the mean rate of CPI inflation, in percent, 1990-2002. Source: IFS,
IMF (Yearbook).25
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minimum maximum Skewness kurtosis
real GDP per
capita
2.07 1.21 0.29 6.00 1.757 6.345
education 5.26 1.32 3.40 8.00 0.653 2.436




20693.5 7526.9 6891.0 36578.6 -0.138 2.492
investment 21.88 4.51 16.91 34.42 1.525 4.630
government
consumption
18.81 5.48 8.69 30.36 0.255 2.738
openness 36.07 26.17 10.06 138.1 2.437 9.810
inflation 4.93 7.10 0.74 37.07 3.741 17.008
COL10 1.57 3.71 0.00 19.00 0.108 19.609
COL20 1.66 2.39 0.00 9.00 1.313 7.523
COM10 0.30 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.827 2.589
COM20 0.92 1.74 0.00 9.00 0.876 18.431
Notes: skewness is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of the series around its mean. The
skewness of a symmetric distribution is zero. Positive (negative) skewness means that the distribution
has a long right (left) tail. Kurtosis measures the peakedness or flatness of the distribution of the series.
If the kutrosis exceeds 3 is peaked relative to the normal; if the kurtosis is less than 3, the distribution is
flat relative to the normal.30
Figure 1
Real GDP per capita growth rates and corporate ownership structure


































Widely-Held Corporate Structure and Economic Growth, cross-sectional
regressions, 27 countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Basic regressions containing only the variable of interest and the always included
variables (I-variables).
Explanatory Variables Regressions

















































COM10 - - 0.021
(1.664)




2 0.114 0.100 0.359 0.196
se 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011
DW 2.516 2.639 2.223 2.469
Reset Ramsey Test 1.889 1.991 0.494 0.561
ARCH(1) 0.099 0.067 0.014 0.099
ARCH(2) 0.238 0.224 0.458 0.247
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.32
Table 3
Widely-Held Corporate Structure and Economic Growth, cross-sectional
regressions, 27 countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Regressions containing the full conditioning information set.









































































































2 0.098 0.304 0.313 0.371 0.413 0.541
se 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.008
DW 2.314 2.365 1.191 1.985 2.412 2.158
Reset Ramsey
Test
1.162 1.045 1.005 0.674 1.243 1.108
ARCH(1) 0.059 0.007 0.283 0.139 0.082 0.190
ARCH(2) 0.203 0.018 0.291 1.021 0.093 0.269
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.33
Table 4
Widely-Held Corporate Structure and Economic Growth, cross-sectional
regressions, 27 countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Regressions containing the full conditioning information set.












































































































2 0.087 0.301 0.322 0.175 0.404 0.532
se 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008
DW 2.388 2.404 2.034 2.015 2.491 2.233
Reset
Ramsey Test
1.289 1.668 0.322 0.799 1.176 1.093
ARCH(1) 0.009 0.076 0.008 0.174 0.049 0.285
ARCH(2) 0.163 0.097 0.004 0.972 0.061 0.361
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.34
Table 5
Widely-Held Corporate Structure and Economic Growth, cross-sectional
regressions, 27 countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Regressions containing the full conditioning information set.














































































































2 0.334 0.437 0.404 0.457 0.503 0.567
se 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008
DW 2.163 2.333 2.010 1.646 2.185 2.005
Reset
Ramsey Test
1.164 1.461 1.869 1.384 1.927 1.631
ARCH(1) 0.031 0.005 0.415 0.152 0.166 0.311
ARCH(2) 0.411 0.010 0.407 1.506 0.231 0.353
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.35
Table 6
Widely-Held Corporate Structure and Economic Growth, cross-sectional
regressions, 27 countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Regressions containing the full conditioning information set.












































































































2 0.184 0.325 0.319 0.420 0.443 0.544
se 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008
DW 2.988 2.366 2.004 1.825 2.288 2.094
Reset
Ramsey Test
0.036 1.731 0.939 1.552 1.954 1.654
ARCH(1) 0.068 0.004 0.262 0.275 0.187 0.162
ARCH(2) 0.230 0.018 0.265 1.654 0.178 0.268
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.36
Table 7
State Corporate Control and Economic Growth, cross-sectional regressions, 27
countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.
Basic regressions containing only the variable of interest and the always included
variables (I-variables).
Explanatory Variables Regressions

















































COMS10 - - -0.001
(-1.564)
-




2 0.106 0.107 0.109 0.109
se 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011
DW 2.512 2.518 2.517 2.517
Reset Ramsey Test 1.717 1.735 1.769 1.791
ARCH(1) 0.195 0.192 0.174 0.170
ARCH(2) 0.387 0.383 0.351 0.345
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.37
Table 8
Institutional Investing and Economic Growth, cross-sectional regressions, 27
countries, 1990-2002
Independent variable: growth rate of real GDP per capita.






















































COMF10 - - -0.0005
(-0.365)
-




2 0.104 0.115 0.101 0.178
se 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011
DW 2.527 2.531 2.507 2.561
Reset Ramsey Test 1.797 1.469 2.174 0.014
ARCH(1) 0.156 0.228 0.105 2.205
ARCH(2) 0.337 0.425 0.275 3.001
Note: T-statistics computed from Newey-West HAC standard errors are presented in parentheses. se is
the standard deviation of the average growth rate, Reset Ramsey Test is a stability test for specification
error, ARCH (1) and ARCH (2) are Engle LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.3839
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